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by Jian Wang
Global trade has experienced a stunning collapse in the current re-
cession, with the World Trade organization estimating a decrease of roughly 
9 percent in 2009—the biggest contraction since the second World War.1 Both 
imports and exports plunged in major trading countries (Chart 1). 
The swift decline caused substantial damage to the global economy, 
hitting Japan and other countries with large trade sectors especially hard. It 
also raised concerns that the trade collapse would worsen the global recession 
and delay recovery. 
several  factors  contributed  to  the  global  trade  collapse.  However, 
the  ultimate  causes  are  tied  to  the  global  financial  crisis  that  started  in   
mid-2007. Financial markets deteriorated over the next year, and the global 
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Chart 2
2009 GDP Growth Forecasts Turn Gloomy During 2008
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months of the year, the forecast for 
2009 gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth went from a moderate slow-
down to a sharp contraction (Chart 2). 
Consumers and investors world-
wide started to realize that the financial 
crisis’ impact on real economies may 
be longer and more severe than they 
had expected. They pulled back signif-
icantly, leading to declines in total con-
sumption and investment that spilled 
over into global trade. Particularly 
hard hit were consumer and producer 
purchases of long-lasting goods. We 
will see that demand for these durable 
goods played an important role in the 
recent global trade collapse. 
Trade Volatility and GDP
The last quarter of 2008 saw GDP 
plunge in much of the world, includ-
ing key countries such as the U.S., 
Germany, Japan and the U.K. (Chart 
3). Understanding how such declines 
in economic activity impact interna-
tional trade starts with a look at two 
persistent patterns in the trade data.
First, imports and exports are 
much more volatile than GDP. Second, 
they generally move in the same 
direction as GDP. The upshot is that 
a steep drop in a country’s GDP usu-
ally results in an even steeper drop in 
imports and exports.
Using the U.S. as an example, we 
look at annualized quarter-to-quarter 
changes in imports, exports and GDP 
since 1980. Over this period, both 
imports and exports show much big-
ger variations than GDP (Chart 4). The 
wide fluctuations obscure the fact that 
imports and exports are also positively 
correlated with GDP—particularly in 
the early 1990s, the first few years of 
the 2000s and the most recent period 
of economic turmoil.2 
Trade volatility and a posi-
tive comovement with GDP aren’t 
limited to U.S. data. Measured by 
their standard deviations, imports 
and exports are about three times as 
volatile as GDP in most Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.3 
Chart 1
Import and Export Growth Rates Fall 
as Recession Deepens
A. Real Imports                                                    B. Real Exports 
Percent*                                                                                        Percent*
*Quarter/quarter, annualized.
SOURCE: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
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Imports and exports are also positively 
correlated with GDP in nearly all of 
these countries.4
Like the U.S., most industrial coun-
tries experienced sharp declines in their 
GDPs in the recent global financial cri-
sis. It’s not surprising that their imports 
and exports fell even more sharply.
The fact that imports and exports 
have greater volatility than GDP ex-
plains why international trade plunges 
in deep recessions. But why is trade 
so much more volatile than GDP? The 
answer is that durable goods make up 
a large fraction of international trade— 
and demand for them is usually very 
volatile.
Trade in Durable Goods
Durable consumption goods and 
private capital investment factor into 
durables trade. Durable goods yield 
service or utility over time. Examples 
include such capital goods as machin-
ery and such consumer goods as 
automobiles, appliances and big-screen 
TVs.
When the economy is expected to 
turn sour, households can put off pur-
chases of consumer durables but can’t 
easily delay purchases of food and 
other goods for quick consumption. 
When inventories start to grow, firms 
don’t expand capacity, and they cancel 
or postpone new investments. Thus, 
demand is generally much more vola-
tile for durable consumer goods and 
investment than for nondurable goods. 
Once again, the U.S. provides a 
good example. We look at annualized, 
quarter-to-quarter percent changes in 
the output of both durable goods and 
nondurable goods and services. The 
data show that durables are more vola-
tile than nondurables (Chart 5).
Durable goods represent a mod-
erate share of the economy in most 
industrial countries—in the U.S., for 
example, they accounted for 23.6 per-
cent of real GDP in 2008. However, 
durable goods make up a large share 
of international trade. In the U.S., they 
accounted for more than 60 percent 
of trade in goods (excluding energy 
Chart 3
Real GDP Declines in Some Major Economies in 2008–09
Percent*
*Quarter/quarter, annualized.
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Chart 5
Growth Rates More Volatile for Durable 















SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
products) in 2008. The figure is 70 per-
cent on average for the OECD coun-
tries, according to several studies.5 
Due to the global financial cri-
sis, worldwide demand for durable 
goods dropped substantially. In the 
first quarter of 2009, for instance, 
demand fell about 20 percent in the 
U.S, Canada, Japan and the U.K., 
adding to the weakness of the pre-
vious two quarters (Chart 6). The 
decline inevitably caused a plunge in 
global trade. 
Worse than Before?
We know that trade declines 
faster than GDP in hard times. But 
how do the declines this time compare 
with those in the previous downturn 
in 2001?
In absolute terms, the fall of U.S. 
imports and exports has been more 
severe than it was in the previous 
recession. However, GDP has also 
declined much more this time. We 
need to take this into account in com-
paring trade flows in the current and 
previous recessions.
U.S. exports relative to GDP fell 
about 16 percent from the second 
quarter of 2008 to the second quarter 
of 2009—the same as they did from 
peak to trough in 2000–01. However, 
the decline in imports has been much 
deeper this time. As a share of GDP, 
they fell 18.3 percent—more than 
twice as much as they did in the pre-
vious downturn.
The decline of durable goods 
contributed heavily to the fall of U.S. 
exports and imports in both reces-
sions, led by big drops in capital 
goods sales (see red section of bars, 
Chart 7A).
In the current recession, export 
losses have been large in automotive 
vehicles, engines and parts (green); 
the category held up much better in 
the less-severe downturn in 2001. 
Automobiles and consumer goods 
account for a large fraction of the 
decline of U.S. imports this time, while 
capital goods less autos led the fall of 
imports in 2001 (Chart 7B). 
Chart 6
Demand for Durable Goods Falls Off Globally
Percent*
*Quarter/quarter, annualized.
NOTE: Canada is used due to insufficient data from Germany.
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These findings are consistent with 
the observation that U.S. households 
have substantially cut back durable 
goods consumption the past two 
years—in contrast to the previous 
recession, when durables purchases 
increased (Chart 7C). This difference 
helps explain why U.S. imports have 
declined much more in the current 
recession than they did in 2001.
Other Mechanisms 
The complexities of modern inter-
national trade factor into the demand 
for goods. Globally intertwined 
mechanisms such as financial markets, 
trade credit and vertical specializa-
tion likely exacerbated the plunge in 
worldwide demand for durable goods 
and the associated collapse of global 
trade. 
The rapid deterioration of the 
global economy after September 2008 
suggests financial markets played an 
important role in the most recent trade 
decline. Since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, banks around the world 
have substantially raised their lending 
standards. Banks usually finance the 
purchases of durable goods by house-
holds and businesses, so tighter lend-
ing practices have restricted spending, 
particularly on durable goods. 
Another often-cited mechanism 
is the collapse in trade credit—loans 
provided to importers and exporters to 
facilitate global trade. A striking feature 
of the financial crisis is the drop in 
international capital flows. Private capi-
tal inflows and outflows as percentage 
of GDP in the U.S. fell significantly 
from 2007 to 2009 (Chart 8). Similar 
patterns exist in other countries.
Without steady capital flows, the 
financing that firms depend on for 
imports and exports dried up, adding 
to weakening global demand. Trade 
finance data are generally unavailable, 
but some evidence of the trade credit 
collapse comes from Brazil, where 
trade credit flows from foreign inves-
tors fell from more than $20 billion in 
2007 into negative territory at the start 
of 2009 (Chart 9).
Chart 7
Factors in the Fall of U.S. Real Exports and Imports
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NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions. The official end of the current recession has yet to be declared.
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Major trade finance providers such 
as Citigroup and HSBC Holdings also 
confirm that the trade-finance business 
is under significant stress globally.6 
Changing production strategies is 
another important factor behind the 
synchronized collapse of international 
trade. Companies increasingly make 
products in sequential stages in several 
countries to exploit the comparative 
advantages of each country at different 
production stages. This internationaliza-
tion of production—often called vertical 
specialization—has been increasing over 
time and helps explain the increase in 
world trade over the past two decades.7 
Greater vertical specialization can 
amplify the decline of international 
trade during recessions.8 Consider two 
cases—one without and one with ver-
tical specialization. 
Without vertical specialization, 
country A imports $100 of goods from 
country B. If country A’s demand for 
imports disappears in a recession, total 
world exports decline $100.
With vertical specialization, goods 
are made in two stages. In the first 
stage, country A produces intermedi-
ate goods and exports them to country 
B for production of final goods. Then 
country B exports the final goods back 
to country A. We further assume that 
the value of intermediate goods is $50 
and the value of final goods is still 
$100. When country A’s demand disap-
pears, the loss of total world exports 
is $150 ($50 from country A to B, plus 
$100 from country B to A). 
The amplification effect can 
become even bigger when the vertical 
specialization involves more than two 
countries. So, the percentage declines 
in real-world trade can grow much larg-
er than the recessions that spawn them. 
More Trade Restraints?
Growing job losses during a reces-
sion usually create the environment 
for another damper on international 
trade—protectionism. There’s little evi-
dence that it has played a role in the 
latest trade collapse, but protectionist 
pressures are rising around the world. 
Chart 8
U. S. Capital Flows Plunge
Percent of GDP












NOTE: Shaded areas represent recessions. The official end of the current recession has yet to be declared.
SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Chart 9
Brazil’s Trade Credit Flows Sink
Billions of U.S. dollars*
*12-month moving total.
NOTE: Trade credit flow is net of the concession and payment of credits linked to trade in goods and services. In Brazil, it 
mainly includes short-term trade financing (up to 260 days) that foreign investors granted to Brazilian firms.
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One sign is the increased filing 
of trade disputes to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the international 
body that governs global trade. Newly 
initiated import restrictions by WTO 
members have steadily risen since the 
third quarter of 2007 as member coun-
tries seek ways to protect domestic 
industries from international competi-
tion. During the first half of 2009, 
WTO members initiated 71 product-
level investigations requesting import 
restrictions, an increase of more than 
20 percent from the first half of 2008 
and 86.8 percent from the first half of 
2007 (Chart 10A).  
Today’s protectionism is frequent-
ly in the guise of nontariff barriers 
such as antidumping actions. The most 
recent global peak came during the 
2001 recession (Chart 10B). So far, this 
recession hasn’t seen a similar surge. 
While still at relatively low levels, 
antidumping measures initiated and 
imposed began rising in 2008. 
The uptick in trade-protection 
measures since 2008 is worth watch-
ing. A lag exists between initiation and 
imposition of import restrictions. In 
the previous recession, total initiations 
peaked in 2001, and total imposed 
antidumping measures jumped the 
next two years. Higher initiations in 
2008 and 2009 are likely to result in 
increased import restrictions in 2010 
and perhaps beyond.
In the second half of 2009, the 
global economy stabilized and started 
showing signs of recovery. The return 
of confidence in global growth has 
boosted demand for durable goods 
and, therefore, global trade. With 
economic conditions expected to con-
tinue improving in 2010, international 
trade is likely to recover in the coming 
months.
However, trade-protection mea-
sures expected to be imposed in 2010 
could create more trade frictions and 
become a drag on the trade rebound. 
And questions remain about how 
robust consumption will be. 
The expansion of global trade 
was fueled by strong U.S. demand the 
Chart 10
Protectionist Activity Begins to Stir
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SOURCE: World Trade Organization member actions as reported in the Global Antidumping Database.
past two decades. The country’s close-
to-zero household saving rate wasn’t 
sustainable in the long run. During 
the current recession, the U.S. savings 
rate has increased, and the current 
account deficit has narrowed. If U.S. 
households’ frugality endures, demand 
may remain relatively soft in the near 
future. A quick global trade rebound 
may depend on trade-surplus countries 
boosting domestic consumption.
Wang is a senior economist in the Research 
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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The Euro and the Dollar
in the Crisis and Beyond
  Leading economists and scholars from the U.S. and Europe 
will gather for a timely discussion about the European Union’s 
common currency in The Euro and the Dollar in the Crisis 
and Beyond, a one-day conference March 17 at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Part  of  the  European  Commission’s  effort  to  mark  the 
euro’s  first  decade,  the  conference  is  cosponsored  by  the 
Dallas Fed, the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
and the European economic institute Bruegel. Presenters will 
review this monumental change in the global economy and 
look closely at such topics as the roles of the euro and dollar 
and lessons from the response to the economic crisis.
The event is open to economists, academicians, policymakers 
and others with interest in the euro’s evolution. To register, go to 
http://dallasfed.org/institute/events/10euro.cfm. There is no 
charge to attend, but registration is required.